This paper analyzes the importance of liquidity in determining security returns for firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange between 1901 and 1919. Using a new and detailed firm-level dataset with matching stock price and balance sheet information, we construct new stock return indices as well as firm-specific liquidity measures for our empirical analysis. Our main finding is that there was a substantial illiquidity effect on returns. Securities in the 25th percentile of the liquidity distribution earned, on average, a 0.59 percent higher monthly return than securities in the 75th percentile. This effect is comparable with estimates from modern stock markets and suggests that the liquidity premium is not solely a modern phenomenon but could be an inherent characteristic of financial markets.
Introduction
Liquidity refers to the ability to trade stocks quickly, and at a low cost. Investors typically like prefer to be able to implement their trading strategies whenever they want and therefore demand compensation-a liquidity premium-for holding relatively illiquid securities. Recent research of trading frictions in modern stock markets has also found ample evidence of such a liquidity premium in security returns. An early study by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) of the U.S. stock market during [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] established that stocks with higher bid-ask spreads-a measure of illiquidity-earned higher returns than other stocks. Subsequently, a number of studies have found similar results for various modern markets.
1 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) have even found variations in liquidity to be of importance for security returns, being weighed by investors as a separate risk factor.
While illiquidity thus appears to be important for asset pricing in today's well-developed financial markets, much less is known about its role in financial markets during the era of industrialization a century ago. Early twentieth century stock markets emerged rapidly as a complementary source of industrial finance as well as an investment opportunity for capital
owners. Yet these early stock markets were typically thin and poorly organized, and liquidity effects may therefore have been particularly strong (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Michie 2006; Cassis 2010) .
In this study we use newly collected and previously unexplored data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) during 1901 (SSE) during -1919 to analyze the role of liquidity for stock returns during the Western industrial breakthrough. Liquidity levels differed greatly across securities in this market, with some companies being traded regularly while others were being traded only a few times a year. These conditions offer a natural setting for testing the effect of liquidity. Our analysis begins with merging stock-market price data along with firm balance sheet data collected from a different source. This process allows us to construct yearly observations for market-to-book ratios, dividend yields, price-earnings and payout ratios, as well as new monthly stock price and return indices for Sweden over the entire study period.
For our main empirical investigation of the effect of liquidity on security returns, we calculate two measures of liquidity: the number of periods traded in relation to the number of periods listed and the relative size of a security's bid-ask spread. The liquidity measures are on a rolling two-year basis (i.e., they reflect the liquidity information available to an investor at each respective point in time). The measures are then used to test for a liquidity premium using Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions with returns as the dependent variable and the liquidity measures and market beta as the explanatory variables. Our main finding is that liquidity was an important factor in the pricing of securities on the Swedish stock market in the early part of the twentieth century. This result holds for both of our proxies of liquidity that were tested on trade-to-trade returns, including dividends, our most reliable measure of stock returns.
Examinations of historical stock markets are on the rise, and in recent years, economic historians have assembled several new datasets. Previous studies looked specifically at liquidity premiums in the past, and these studies offer natural points of comparisons for our analysis.
The papers closest to our study are those by Moore (2010a) and Burhop and Gelman (2010) .
Moore investigates financial trading at the stock exchanges in Madrid and Zurich during 1902-1925 and finds evidence of a positive liquidity premium. Burhop and Gelman, in contrast, find the opposite results in their analysis of daily returns and trading costs on the Berlin stock exchange between 1892 and 1913. Our paper distinguishes itself from these two studies in how we construct our proxies for liquidity and in the fact that we conduct the analysis on a different country, Sweden. While comparing the answers from modern financial markets to questions regarding, for example, the role of financial institutional development, contrasting our findings for the early Stockholm Stock Exchange with similar findings from other early stock markets both indicates the external validity of the results and offers insights into the role of stock markets during eras of industrialization.
Overview of the early twentieth century Stockholm Stock Exchange
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Sweden was beginning an era of unprecedented industrial expansion and economic development. In the wake of scientific advancements and macroeconomic stability due to the international gold standard, Sweden experienced its own -upstream industrialization‖ with a boost in the manufacturing, chemical, electrical and pulp and paper industries. During this period, several of the Swedish innovation-intensive firms became world leaders in their respective industries. Such examples include ASEA (electrotechnology), LM Ericsson (telecommunication), SKF (ball bearing) and Separator (dairy).
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Economic growth rates also increased, from an average level of between zero and one percent annually in the nineteenth century, to an average annual growth rate of around two percent in the first two decades of the twentieth century (Edvinsson, 2005) . This was indeed an era of industrial breakthrough within the Swedish economy.
The Stockholm Stock Exchange was founded in 1863. During its first four decades of existence, the exchange was mainly a loosely organized venue for recurrent monthly or weekly securities auctions hosted by some of the appointed city brokers. 3 As the Swedish industrialization gradually expanded, new joint-stock companies emerged, and households grew richer;
the need for an organized, designated market for securities trading arose. As a consequence, in 1901, the exchange was thoroughly reorganized. The trading structure on the new exchange was largely a copy of the structure of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, except that the auctioning system already in place was kept, in contrast to Copenhagen's dealership market. Trading in Stockholm was presided over by the head of the exchange who called out all of the stocks registered in a predetermined order. As the head of the exchange called out a stock, all market participants were able to state the levels at which they were willing to buy/sell (the bid and ask quotes). When a matching bid level and an ask level arose, a trade was registered, and the transaction was completed.
Under the new framework, trading would solely be conducted for listed securities. Listing securities was contingent on a successful written application submitted to the board of the stock exchange, containing detailed information on the security (e.g., articles of association and the latest audit report, among other items). The new system also dictated that only brokers certified by one of the city's commissions were allowed to broker deals on the exchange.
Trading initially took take place three times a week, but by the end of the study period, auctions were held daily. and November 3rd. Leaving the gold standard, combined with an initial boom in the export oriented domestic industry, made the rate of inflation rise in Sweden during the war. This inflation boom was one of the factors behind a remarkable increase in trading activity on the exchange during these years; stocks are normally one of the few forms of inflation-secure investments. This increased activity in the Swedish economy spurred increased volumes of new equity issues, which were at century-high levels (2-4 percent of total market capitalization) during this period (Waldenström, 2004) . After the war, however, the spectacular wartime bull market gave way to a devastating market crash when Sweden joined the Gold Standard at prewar parity, which set off a deflationary spiral. For an account of the Swedish WWI economy and the deflation crisis, see Haavisto and Jonung (1995) .
pitalization of the Stockholm market (see the next section for how this is done) and then convert it from Swedish kronors to British pounds using exchange rates in Edvinsson, Jacobson and Waldenström (2010) . In terms of listed equity (i.e., excluding bonds), the market capita- Table 1 reports the average dividend yield, which was 4.4 percent. Excess returns are calculated using the minimum-lending rate, the discount rate, set by the Swedish Riksbank as a proxy for the risk-free rate.
Balance sheet data
Among our study's empirical contributions is the matching of market price data and balance sheet information assembled from separate sources. We use Key-Åberg's Svenska aktiebolag och enskilda banker, a yearly catalogue covering about half of Sweden's joint-stock companies. Standard balance sheet items regarding assets and liabilities are reported as are, in most cases, profit and loss accounts. Year 1903 is missing, and for the purpose of computing our capital-weighted stock return index, we assume that the share capital is constant for those companies where we observe no change in share capital from 1902 to 1904.
A number of firms appearing on the stock price lists are not covered in Key-Åberg's catalogues. For these firms, we consequently lack information about equity capital. The exact reasons for and consequences of this partial coverage are not clear, but we do not believe that it will have any meaningful influence on our results. We discovered that a great number of the companies appearing on the price lists were never traded or even allowed to be traded at the exchange. This is especially the case of the early price lists published before the exchange introduced its official listing in 1912. 11 Furthermore, most companies did not allow the public to take part in the initial public offerings of their shares; instead these shares remained in the 10 Möller uses the same method that Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1989) use later. Frennberg and Hansson (1992) check Möller's weights by cross-checking using a random sample from the 1980s to find little or no difference. 11 Algott (1962, pp. 128-148) mentions how the board of the exchange noted at several occasions during 1901-1911 how the unofficial price lists (also those used in this study) included companies that were not on the board's -list of accepted companies‖.
hands of the individuals sitting on the companies' boards. 12 When assessing the balance sheet coverage among the firms for which we have recurrent price quotes, thus allowing for us to compute stock returns (a necessary condition for being included in the empirical analysis), roughly 90 percent also have balance sheet data (Table 1 , row 10). Thus, it is primarily in the large group of listed but non-traded companies where the missing balance sheet information dominates. Due to this lack of data, we are unable to formally analyze whether this missing information is systemic with respect to background characteristics such as firm size or profitability. Nevertheless, we make an attempt at this analysis by examining whether there is some distinct pattern in industrial composition (we use five broad categories: banking, insurance, industrials, transport and shipping) across firms with and without balance sheet data. The result is that we do not find any apparent pattern distinguishing the two groups from each other. In both of them, about 40 percent of the companies are banks, 40 percent are industrials and the rest are divided almost equally among the remaining three groups.
We also examine the size distribution among the firms in our final dataset. Table 2 [ Table 2 about here]
Constructing stock return and price indices
Monthly stock returns and price indices at the Stockholm Stock Exchange are needed for the analysis. However, no such indices covering the entire study period exist. Therefore, we con-struct new stock market indices using the new firm-level database. We use a monthly rather than weekly frequency due to the large numbers of missing weekly observations for most of the listed companies.
Two separate indices are computed: a stock return index and a stock price index, with the former also including dividend yields. Specifically, we denote the stock price and dividend of company month as and , respectively. Capital weighted indices are used because we believe that they better reflect the overall activity level of the exchange.
14 Equation (1) shows the capital weighted stock price index, which thus reflects the capital gains accruing from price changes between periods weighted by firm-specific equity weights:
.
Equivalently, the capital-weighted total returns index, i.e., when we sum capital gain and dividend yield, is calculated as follows:
Weights, computed for each firm and period, are defined as ,
where is the number of outstanding shares of company at month . These two indices are displayed in Figure 2 .
[ Figure 2 about here]
The returns are calculated using a so-called -trade-to-trade‖ method. In using this method, returns are calculated only for those securities for which we observe closing prices in two 14 We have evaluated our capital weighted index against an equally weighted index for which we also have also run the entire analysis, with only small differences in the findings (available from the authors upon request).
consecutive months. 15 One problem with these returns is that they may correspond to different holding periods when, for example, the two closing prices do not necessarily come from the last trading day in the month. The solution to this non-synchronous data problem is to use the method of Dimson and Marsh (1983) , by which excess returns are scaled according to the square root of the trading days' (in 28-day units) between closing prices.
Our capital-weighted indices suffer from a potential survivorship bias, as we are unable to determine whether discontinued trading is a consequence of bankruptcy or of delisting. The impact on our indices should, however, be limited because the price of a security should reflect a looming bankruptcy. An additional problem is that we have not adjusted for any new share issues that occur during a year, as we assume that the share capital is constant over each calendar year. However, the index used for the period from 1906-1918 by Waldenström (2004) is adjusted for new share issues and displays little difference in comparison to our capital-weighted trade-to-trade index (correlation coefficient of 0.82), indicating that our potential lag in taking new share issuing into account has but a minor effect. 
Measuring liquidity
Liquidity is a multifaceted concept. It refers to the ease with which investors can sell an asset, but there are many different sources that give rise to illiquidity. Among the most important sources are transaction costs (e.g., brokerage fees and transfer taxes), market depth (i.e., how much the price changes when a sell order is placed) and information asymmetries (in which some party has an information advantage that could incur losses for other parties, who accordingly demand a premium in order to make a trade).
17 15 We have also run the main analysis using returns calculated somewhat differently, allowing for a time span of up to 12 months between two observed closing prices. Using this method we include almost all observations in the dataset (98 percent) while the trade-to-trade method includes a mere 76 percent. However, the longer time span between closing prices reduces the reliability in the estimated returns. The results (available upon request) using this alternative returns measure confirm the main message of Table 4 , i.e., the existence of a significant liquidity premium. 16 Waldenström uses as its main source the contemporary financial magazine Kommersiella meddelanden and an adjusted variant of it published by Östlind (1945) . Additional discrepancies can be explained by the fact that the KMI index used book values as weights, while we use market values. 17 Glosten and Milgrom (1985) explain how adverse selection problems in stock trading can give rise to bid-ask spreads. Additional sources of illiquidity that are commonly referred to in the literature (see, e.g., Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen, 2005) are search frictions (costs arising when sellers search for willing buyers) and inventory risks (typically born by market makers).
Although the meaning of liquidity is typically intuitive, it can be a difficult concept to measure empirically. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) point to the need for detailed highfrequency data, but even with such data at hand, they emphasize that all measures are imperfect proxies of liquidity because they can never capture all of the different sources at the same time. Among the most common proxies for liquidity (or illiquidity) are the bid-ask spread, the trading volume, the turnover rate (number of traded shares over the total number of outstanding shares) or variants of these. 18 For historical eras, liquidity measures will show more variance for a number of reasons, such as a relatively low data frequency and scarce knowledge of important market features, such as order depth. Yet, the liquidity proxies used in this study are quite similar to the ones used in more contemporary analyses, and the results are broadly comparable in most relevant aspects.
Our empirical investigation relies on two preferred proxies of liquidity and a third one used for the purpose of robustness. The first proxy, called LIQ1, is a measure of trading intensity that we calculate as the number of weeks in which a stock is traded in relation to the number of weeks in which it is listed over the past 24 months.
We only include securities with at least six months of closing prices within the rolling twoyear window. Estimates based on fewer observations would be unreliable. As a consequence, the sample is reduced to 108 securities.
The second proxy is the average relative bid-ask spread over the past 24 months. Spreads reflect a number of illiquidity sources, including processing costs and information asymmetries, and we calculate them as the spread between the price that a stock can be sold for (the bid price) and the price it costs to purchase it (the ask price). Although it is really a projection of illiquidity rather than liquidity, we call it LIQ2 for convenience and calculate it as follows:
18 Examples of other common proxies are illiquidity discounts estimated from initial public offerings or restricted stock offerings (see Amihud, Medelson and Pedersen, 2005) .
For the purpose of robustness, we also compute a third proxy of liquidity: the average value of traded shares. We do not include this measure in our main analysis because trading volumes were unfortunately not reported in the Stockholm price lists until 1915. We define LIQ3 as the value of a company's traded stocks divided by the number of weeks the company was listed over the past 24 months:
In Figure 3 , we display the distribution of liquidity (and illiquidity) across individual securi- [ Figure 3 about here]
The use of a rolling 24-month window when calculating security-specific liquidity levels is primarily motivated by the fact that liquidity levels do not remain constant over time. Ideally, this measure should reflect investors' views on a security's future liquidity level. It is plausible to imagine that investors consider current and recent liquidity levels when forming their expectations and that they update their considerations as the realized liquidity changes. As a result, one could also imagine that securities contain a set of inherent characteristics associated with their liquidity level and that these characteristics only change very slowly. In such cases, a more appropriate strategy would be to estimate liquidity levels over the whole study period instead of over rolling two-year windows. We therefore rerun the analysis using constant firm liquidity levels and present the results in the robustness section below.
In addition to estimating firm-specific liquidity levels, we investigate the evolution of overall market liquidity and its potential impact on security returns. This analysis is conducted by defining Market liquidity, following the reasoning for our first proxy above, as the number of traded securities divided by the number of listed securities: . [ Figure 4 about here]
Results

A first look at the data
In an initial effort to create an overview of our liquidity measures and their relationship to returns and firm size, we construct four portfolios for each month, with portfolio one consisting of the least liquid securities and portfolio four consisting of the most liquid securities. The liquidity of each security is measured using the last two years' worth of observations. In addition, we construct four portfolios based on the market capitalization of each firm, where portfolio one contains the smallest firms and portfolio four contains the largest firms. The average return and standard deviation of all portfolios can be seen in Table 3 , both excluding and including dividends.
[ Table 3 about here]
As expected, we find that portfolios with low-liquidity securities exhibit higher returns (an indication of a liquidity premium). The average return of the securities listed in liquidity port-folio one is about one percentage point higher than that of portfolio four for all liquidity measures, which holds true when either excluding or including dividend returns. There is an evident relationship between liquidity and returns; in general, a higher liquidity portfolio will offer a lower average return. However, somewhat unexpectedly, we do not observe a negative relationship between liquidity and the volatility of returns. The relationship seems to be inconclusive. The portfolios that are based on size display a negative relationship between size and returns. Also, we can observe that the returns of smaller firms' stocks are more volatile than those of larger firms, as we expected.
The impact of liquidity and liquidity risk on returns
There are two main channels through which liquidity should theoretically influence securities returns. The first channel is the liquidity level effect. Due to higher transaction costs, demand pressures and information asymmetries, illiquid securities are relatively costly to sell, and investors, therefore, require some sort of compensation-an illiquidity premium-for holding them. According to this logic, there should be a negative relationship between liquidity and stock returns. The second channel is liquidity risk as a risk factor that investors wish to price.
Liquidity changes over time, which gives rise to uncertainty about the size of future transactions as well as higher price fluctuations (given that liquidity influences price levels). Accordingly, stocks that are sensitive to liquidity shocks should yield a return premium in order to compensate investors for the additional liquidity risk.
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the two-step procedure suggested by Fama and MacBeth (1973) . This is a well-known method for assessing a stock's price sensitivity towards the market risk premium that is based on the predictions of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model. We introduce liquidity to the Fama-MacBeth procedure by adding a liquidity risk premium as previously suggested in a number of studies. Furthermore, we follow Moore (2010a) and construct a variable, a market liquidity shock, which captures the difference between the expected market liquidity and the actual market liquidity. The shock is estimated as the residual ( ) in an autoregressive model with two lags:
. 19 Investors 19 The market liquidity equation has an adjusted R 2 of 0.98 which in turn implies that any residual will constitute a shock to market participants. We have simulated market liquidity using AR(1), AR(2), AR(3) and AR(4) models and found that the AR(2) model has the highest adjusted r-square value. In theory, investors would prefer to are expected to prefer holding securities with a negative correlation to market liquidity shocks because these securities will offset part of the negative liquidity effect.
The first step of the augmented Fama-MacBeth procedure is to estimate security-specific time series regressions. Specifically, we regress the excess security return, i.e., the return minus the risk-free rate, on the market excess return, the market liquidity shock, a constant and a random error term. This gives us estimates of the market beta, , and the market liquidity risk, :
(8)
In the second step, cross-section regressions are estimated across all securities, one month at a time. The dependent variable is still the securities' excess returns, but on the right hand side we now include the estimated factor sensitivities for market risk ( ), liquidity risk ( ) and the level of liquidity (LIQ). Furthermore, we also include additional controls. One such control is size of the firm, measured as the market value of equity (size) following the widespread evidence of a correlation between market value and stock returns (Banz, 1981) .
Another is the book-to-market ratio, i.e., the ratio of companies' equity values according to their books in comparison to their market values (BTM). A relatively high BTM signals that companies have low market prices because they typically have low earnings on assets. The resulting second-pass regression then becomes: .
(9)
Parameters and represent market risk and liquidity risk premiums, respectively, and are both expected to be positive. Parameter is the cross-sectional impact of liquidity on excess returns, and according to the standard liquidity-augmented asset pricing models, we hold securities with a negative correlation to market liquidity shocks because these securities will offset part of the negative liquidity effect. 20 All variables in equation 8 (and the subsequent equation 9) are scaled by the inverse square root of the number of trading days between quoted prices in units of 28 days following the method of Dimson and Marsh (1983) for correcting non-synchronous trading data. 21 Furthermore, in all tests in which we include liquidity measure two (the relative bid-ask spread), we need to correct for the bid-ask bounce identified by Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2010) . We do this by performing weighted least squares regressions with the previous month's return plus one as weight.
expect it to be negative for liquidity proxies LIQ1 (average trading intensity) and LIQ3 (volume) and positive for LIQ2 (relative bid-ask spread).
The gamma estimates in equation (9) (1992) , is to multiply the standard error with an adjustment factor . All results are reported using Shanken-corrected standard errors.
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Our main results from the multifactor Fama-MacBeth specifications are presented in Table 4 .
The upper panel is based on total returns, including dividends, while the lower panel uses stock price returns. The results are presented for the two full-period proxies of liquidity, LIQ1
(share of listed weeks traded) and LIQ2 (the relative bid-ask spread). Overall, there are fairly strong indications of a liquidity level effect on the early Swedish stock market. The estimated coefficients for LIQ1 are significantly negative, and for LIQ2, they are significantly positive in the one-, three-and four-factor models for returns, both including and excluding dividends.
In contrast, we find no evidence of a liquidity risk premium; the coefficients are mostly negative (wrong sign) but with large standard errors so that they should be regarded as being virtually zero in all specifications. In other words, while investors seem to have priced the liquidity level, they did not do so regarding the exposure to an increased overall risk of higher liquidity.
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There are, however, some signs of instability in the measured effects. First, the coefficient of LIQ2 in the four-factor model is more than three times as large as in the one-and three-factor models. Controlling for the variation coming from firm size, hence, seems to boost the liquidity premium, indicating that firm size and liquidity level are interrelated. Yet, when also controlling for the book-to-market ratio, the liquidity-level effect disappears entirely; even the 22 The exact magnitude of the errors-in-variables bias is, however, uncertain. According to Jagannathan and Wang (1998) , it is even zero in the Fama-MacBeth procedure whenever standard errors are heteroskedastic. 23 The results are not sensitive to the extremely weak activity levels in the first two years of the sample period. When we exclude them and rerun the main analysis, the results (available upon request) are basically the same. Table 4) . At the annual level, this reflects a 4.9 percent increase, which is quite large given that the compounded total return over the entire period was 3.9 percent. As a further illustration, consider the estimated coefficient of the LIQ1 variable in Table 4 's four-factor models. As previously stated, the relationship is of a log-linear character; therefore, the economic significance of improved liquidity changes depending on how liquid the security is to begin with. Investing in the 25th percentile of the most illiquid securities will earn investors an extra 0.59 percent in monthly returns, 7.2 percent annualized, compared to investing in the 75th percentile of most illiquid securities, representing a difference of about one and a half standard deviations in liquidity.
[ Table 4 about here]
Our findings of a fairly significant liquidity premium, but no clear liquidity risk premium, are partially supported in previous liquidity studies. For example, in their studies of postwar NYSE returns, Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyan (1998) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive liquidity premiums of 3.5 percent per year, while Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find it to be smaller, about 1.8 percent. In other words, our estimated premiums from the early Stockholm market are large relative to modern estimates.
Looking at other historical stock markets, there are a couple of previous investigations similar to ours. Moore (2010a) studies the early stock markets in Spain and Switzerland using a new monthly database for 1900-1925. He finds positive and significant liquidity premiums that are also somewhat lower than ours; annual premiums for shifting from high to low liquidity portfolios are about 3.6 percent in Madrid and 3.9 percent in Zurich. Burhop and Gelman (2010) study daily German returns for the period of 1892-1913, but they find a significantly negative liquidity premium of 2.8 percent at the annual level. Notably both of these two studies use the same econometric strategy as we do, namely multifactor Fama-MacBeth estimations. What differs is the exact method by which the measures of liquidity are constructed, as well as data frequency in the German case. Until these details are fully accounted for, it is difficult to draw comprehensive conclusions from this historical comparison except that the Stockholm results do not extend readily to other contemporary European markets.
Robustness analysis
This section presents the different robustness checks of the main analysis. In the first check, we rerun the analysis using our third liquidity proxy, LIQ3, which is the average trading volume over the previous 24-month period. Recall that this variable is only available from 1915 onwards. We expect this variable to have a negative relation to excess returns, which is what the results in Table 5 show. In all specifications, LIQ3 initially is negative and has a magnitude that is in line with the other two liquidity measures, but the standard errors are too large to allow for any wide-ranging conclusions. With respect to the main analysis, however, using LIQ3 as a measure of liquidity does not raise any red flags.
[ Table 5 about here]
Another sensitivity check refers to the potential impact of World War I. As described above, the war greatly affected the Swedish economy and, in particular, the stock market due to an export-led boom that boosted corporate profits, trading volumes and stock prices. We assess the potential impact on the liquidity-return relationship by rerunning our main specifications but restricting the sample to the World War I period. The results are displayed in the upper panel of Table 6 , and they corroborate our main findings. If anything, the liquidity level effect on stock returns was reinforced during the war, with estimated liquidity premiums around 10 percent annually. One part of this premium can be readily explained by increased securities transactions taxes (before 1909 they were zero; in 1919, they were 0.6 percent of the transfer) as well as tightened rules for security-backed lending.
Yet another sensitivity check is to alter the way in which firm-specific liquidity is measured.
Specifically, we have so far assumed that investors form conjectures of firms' liquidity cha-racteristics by observing current and past liquidity levels over a rolling 24-month window.
But if changing liquidity levels primarily reflect business cycle variations and if a company's liquidity status is closely related to some set of inherent characteristics that do not change over time, then a constant measure is preferred. Consequently, we compute period-constant versions of our LIQ1 and LIQ2 measures and rerun the Fama-MacBeth regressions. The results in the lower panel of Table 6 raise some questions for the main analysis, as there are no evident signs of any liquidity premium when a constant liquidity measure is being used.
Standard errors are large throughout, and in two cases for LIQ1, the estimated coefficients sometimes have the wrong sign. These results are problematic with respect to our main findings, but we are still not convinced that such a constant liquidity characteristic is appropriate given the profound changes in the structure, conduct and performance of the Swedish stock market during this time period.
[ Table 6 about here]
A fourth robustness check is to include controls for other firm characteristics that may interact with liquidity or returns, affecting the examined liquidity premiums. In Table 7 , we replace the size and book-to-market controls with three other firm-specific variables taken from the balance sheet data that are commonly used in stock valuation decisions: dividend yield (the annual dividend divided by the stock's market price), price/earnings ratio (the stock price divided by the past year's actual earnings per share) and the payout ratio (the share of net earnings paid out as dividends). The negative liquidity level effect is largely sustained when using these new controls and the LIQ1 proxy, but when using LIQ2, the premium vanishes. As for the liquidity risk effect, the results are equal to those in the main analysis, which means minimal variances from zero.
[ Table 7 about here]
Finally, we split the listed firms into four groups according to the size of their market capitalization. This is a complementary analysis to the inclusion of firm size as a factor in the main return equations, and its primary motivation is that firm value is both a potential return determinant and an outcome variable. Table 8 shows the results from this sample-split exercise, and neither liquidity level nor liquidity risk appears to exhibit any clear pattern or connection with firm size. 24 In other words, the liquidity-return relationship found earlier does not seem to be predominant among only certain subgroups of firms, e.g., large or small firms. Rather, the liquidity premium is prevalent throughout the domain of listed firms during this early era.
[ Table 8 about here]
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the relationship between liquidity and stock returns in an early stock market, the Stockholm Stock Exchange during 1901-1919. This period was the heyday of Swedish industrialization, and the market for private credit and investments was expanding rapidly. Although the stock market was still in its infancy, an increasing number of companies decided to float their shares on the exchange, and trading occurred continuously throughout the period. An adequate pricing of shares must have been vital in order for the exchange to fulfill its purposes, and in this study, we examine whether the liquidity within the market influenced the value and thus returns of listed firms.
Our most important finding is that liquidity was indeed an important factor in the pricing of securities. This finding is robust in measuring liquidity as the relative number of periods in which a security is traded or as the relative size of a security's bid-ask spread, as well as in determining whether returns should include dividends. There are some indications that the liquidity premium may be affected by other factors; when we control for firm-specific bookto-market ratios, the liquidity effect disappears. Yet, whether this represents a serious problem or whether it is rather an indication of underlying interrelationships that are unaccounted for, we cannot tell. Overall, it seems that investors who were willing to hold less liquid securities were compensated in the form of higher returns. Our illustrative calculations of the liquidity premium show that the premium was large: investing in the 25th percentile of most illiquid securities earned an extra 0.59 percent in monthly returns, compared with the returns from investing in the 75th percentile of illiquid securities.
Our findings appear to be in line with most of the previous studies of liquidity premiums, although we find the premium to be somewhat larger than authors have found when using more recent data collected from modern markets. This agreement suggests that liquidity premiums are not solely a modern phenomenon, but that they may even be an inherent characteristic of secondary securities markets. A century ago, liquidity premiums were even potentially larger than they are today, which raises questions about the role of institutional financial development. Yet, there are still few studies of stock market liquidity premiums in Europe during the industrialization time period, and some of these analyses even find negative liquidity premiums. One should therefore be cautious when extrapolating the evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange and marrying the results to other historical markets until we know more about what is driving the premiums as well as their different sizes across early European stock markets. Note: The table includes the average monthly returns and standard deviation (in brackets) of returns for four different liquidity portfolios. The portfolios are equally weighted and are comprised of securities with similar liquidity levels. Portfolio one includes the least liquid securities in the month and portfolio four the most liquid securities. Furthermore, we construct the same portfolios depending on firms' market capitalization. In this case, portfolio one includes the smallest firms and portfolio four the largest. The portfolios are reconstructed each month as securities' liquidity levels and the securities themselves change. Liquidity measure one is defined as the number of weeks a security is traded divided by the number of weeks listed. Liquidity measure two is defined as the average bid-ask spread divided by the average of the bid and ask quotes. The liquidity measures have been estimated in each period using two years of historic data. The size variable is defined as the natural log of market capitalization at the start of the year. The sample consists of 6,232 observations spread over 192 months Note: The dependent variable is excess security return. We use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step methodology as specified in equations (8) and (9). LIQ1 is the average trading weeks over listed weeks, and LIQ2 is the relative bid-ask spread. Both are estimated using a two-year rolling window. Liquidity risk and market return are obtained using the Dimson and Marsh (1983) procedure to correct for non-synchronous trading. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the latest available market capitalization. BTM denotes book-to-market ratio. We correct for the bid-ask bounce related to liquidity measure two by estimating a weighted least squares model suggested by Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2007) with weights equal to a previous period's return plus one. Standard errors in parenthesis are Shanken (1992) -corrected. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table 4 except for the fact that liquidity is defined over the entire study period (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) instead of over a rolling 24-month window. Table 4 , Col. 2) estimates for market return beta. Returns include dividends. Groups consist of firms ranked according to market-valued equity size, with Group 1 containing the largest firms and Group 4 the smallest.
